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Industrial control Network (ICN) such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi-
tion (SCADA) system are widely used in industries for monitoring and controlling
physical processes. These industries include power generation facilities, oil and
gas,telecommunication and transport. The integration of internet exposes these
systems to cyber threats. The consequences of compromised ICN are detrimental
for a country economic and functional sustainability. In this thesis we are propos-
ing an Anomaly Detection Method for ICN by using the physical properties of the
system. We have developed operational baseline of Electricity generation process
and reduce the feature set by using feature selection algorithms. The classification
is done by using Support Vector Machine, k-Nearest Neighbor and C4.5 Decision
Tree. Finally, we present the accuracy results of our proposed anomaly detection
method. We have achieved near ideal results for our proposed approach.
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ﻻت دارة واﻻﺗﺼﺎﻔﻂ واﻟﻐﺎز واﻟﻨﻔﺎﯾﺎت واﻟﻤﯿﺎه واﻹھﺬه اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت ﺗﺸﻤﻞ ﻣﺮاﻓﻖ ﺗﻮﻟﯿﺪ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ واﻟﻨ
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ﻟﺪوﻟﺔ د اﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﺈن اﻟﻌﻮاﻗﺐ اﻟﺨﻄﯿﺮة ﻟﺸﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺘﺤﻜﻢ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ ﺗﻌﺘﺒﺮ ﺿﺮر أﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎ
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  ﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺧﻮارزﻣﯿﺎت اﺧﺘﯿﺎر اﻟﻤﯿﺰة.ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ اﻟﻤﺰاﯾﺎ ﺑﺎ
ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﮭﺎﯾﺔ, ﻓﺈﻧﻨﺎ ﻧﻘﺪم  .ﺷﺠﺮة اﻟﻘﺮار5.4C و اﻻﻗﺮباﻟﺠﺎر -K آﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺠﮭﺎت,  ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪاماﻟﺘﺼﻨﯿﻒ ﺗﻢ 
ﻟﻠﻤﻨﮭﺞ  ﻗﺮب ﻟﻠﻤﺜﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﺻﻮلاﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺪﻗﯿﻘﺔ ﻟﻄﺮﯾﻘﺘﻨﺎ اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮﺣﺔ ﻟﻜﺸﻒ اﻟﺸﺬوذ. ﺣﻘﻘﻨﺎ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ا
  اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮح
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are widely used in industries for monitoring and
controlling physical process. These industries include power generation facilities
(conventional and nuclear), oil and gas industries, waste and water management,
telecommunication and transport. The main motivation for employing ICS for
these process is to supervise, control and monitor geographically dispersed re-
source in these industries. Industrial Control System involves the data trans-
fer between control center, Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)/ Programmable Logic
Control (PLC) and operator terminal. This collected data provides information
about the states of monitored system. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) is a type of Industrial Control Systems. It is responsible for monitoring
and controlling industrial process to ensure continuous operations and safety of
the plant and human beings.
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1.1 SCADA Architecture
The SCADA system can be divided into two layers [1, 2], namely client layer
and data server layer. The client layer is responsible for Human Machine In-
terface (HMI), logging of data, archiving and reporting, batch processing while
the data server layer handles the communication between RTU/PLC and field
devices. However in [3], a three layered open (vendor neutral) SCADA Architec-
ture is presented, they divide the data server layer into, Process Control and Field
Instrumentation layer, this three layer architecture has some overlap between pro-
cess control layer and client layer which is termed as Supervisory control layer in
this architecture. Each of these layers is described below.
1.1.1 Supervisory Control Layer
This layer is responsible for providing the Human Machine Interface (HMI) or Man
Machine Interface (MMI), periodic data polling Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) or
Programmable Logic Control (PLC) devices. The master station is responsible for
polling and processing of the data from field devices through Remote Terminal
Unit (RTU) and presenting it to human operator in a form that operator can
work with [4]. Depending on the complexity of the process control network, the
master station can delegate some of its tasks to sub-master station and only
received aggregate data from these stations. The Master stations consist of a
single computer or multiple networked computers, each with dedicated duties for
e.g. archiving, trending, alarm handling etc. The operator station is connected
2
to the master station through LAN and presented the data on console. It also
provide control panel for controlling remote devices.
1.1.2 Process Control Layer
This layer acts as the interface between physical processes and SCADA system.
This interface is typically provided through (RTU) or PLC. These are intelligent
devices which have control program stored in them which are usually written
as ladder logic [3]. These control programs allow changes to running state of
the devices attached to them through actuators. Besides controlling the state
of the process, these devices are also responsible for polling the data from these
devices and transmitting back to Master Station. The transmission of data uses
different communication protocol and varies on the type of medium used. PLC
is a special purpose computer with memory and I/O, traditionally they dont
have communication module but modern PLCs have communication capabilities.
Similarly RTUs were generally used to provide I/O interface and communication
capabilities and connected to intelligent controller for control program but modern
RTU have incorporated the controller, these development blur the differentiating
line between PLC and RTU. The I/O interfaces of these devices can be digital or
analog; different PLCs come in different configuration. Typically analog I/O are
used for measured values for e.g. pressure, temperature or speed while digital I/O
are used for presenting the state of a system for e.g. valve state (open/close).
3
Figure 1.1: General SCADA Architecture
1.1.3 Field Instrumentation Layer
This layer is comprises of different sensors and actuators. The control signals
received through RTU are executed through actuators and data acquisition is
done through sensors for e.g. reservoir level meters, water flow meters, valve
position transmitters etc.
1.2 SCADA Software
The SCADA software can be divided into two categories of open, proprietary and
commercial software. The proprietary software are designed for specific hardware
and usually main concerned with process control [4], while many modern SCADA
systems are using commercial off the shelf (COTS) software for various applica-
tions. The main objectives of COTS are to be compatible with wide range of
SCADA products. The main functionalities of the SCADA software are discussed
below.
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1.2.1 Human Machine Interface
This software provides the interface to an operator to interact with the controlled
system and provides the holistic view of controlled system for e.g. Power gen-
eration plant by integrating data from different sources through Master Station.
HMI software is available as commercial software for e.g. Systemview [5] and usu-
ally installed on Microsoft Windows platform. The HMI provides a holistic view
of the controlled process to an operator by integrating data from different RTU
through master station. Modern HMI software provides rich graphical visualiza-
tion of the controlled process. The other functionality of HMI software includes
alarm management; it displays alarms from different devices to an operator and
provides control options to manage these alarms.
1.2.2 Logging and Archiving
A scalable and robust logging system is needed for a SCADA system because the
amount of information from RTUs is massive. The need for logging the data is
essential for a SCADA system, as it is need to retrieve the information about
device operation statistics. The logging is done for the most recent data, while
archiving is storing the logged data for long term use. The logging frequency is
dependent on the nature of the application; it is performed on a cyclic basis or can
be event triggered. The logged information from logging or archive database is
used to perform trend & analytical analysis. The logging system integrates with
HMI and trending systems.
5
1.2.3 Automation Software
Automation software is used to configure and maintain control application in RTU
and PLCs. Each vendor has its own software that configures its PLCs or RTU for
example Siemens PLC are configured through Step 7 [6] software by using ladder
logic as option. The automation software configures the PLCs / RTU control logic
and defines action on different events.
1.3 Communication Protocols
The communication between RTU / PLC and Master station is governed by set
of rules and standard, this include addressing scheme, message format and data
types. Master station send command to RTUs to perform an action or request
for information and RTUs respond to these commands, the rules for each type of
such transaction is set by communication protocol. There are many protocols in
use but the most popular protocols are Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol
3.0 (DNP 3.0) and IEC 60870-5-101.
1.3.1 Modbus
MODBUS is an application layer messaging protocol, which establishes rules and
message structure for the communication between endpoints (PLCs) and Master
Station. It operates on the principle request/reply mechanism and defines services
by different function codes, where masters station send request for service by
specifying appropriate function code to slave devices and responses from slave
6
devices and use function code to represent the outcome of the performed action.
It was developed in 1979 by Modicon as a serial line protocol, which is currently
owned by Schiender Electric. MODBUS protocol define application layer, which
assume abstract transport layer and allow the exchange of the data, independent of
the underlying communication layer [7]. This allow the MODBUS to be deployed
over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), currently there are two variants of
MODBUS
i Modbus Serial
ii Modbus TCP.
Modbus over Serial Line
MODBUS Serial Line protocol is a Master-Slave protocol [8], and operates at data
link layer of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. In this model only one
master (at same time) is connected to maximum of 247 slave devices via shared
bus, the master issues commands to slave for an action or information and receive
responses in the results of these commands. Slave devices dont communicate with
each other and dont initiate the communication. The Master can issue commands
to slave device in either unicast mode or broadcast mode. At the physical layer, the
MODBUS can employ different physical layer protocol for e.g. (RS485, RS232).
TIA/EIA-485 (RS485) [8].
7
Modbus over TCP/IP
The MODBUS over TCP/IP is based on client/server architecture and provides
interconnection between different devices in a MODBUS network and also be-
tween different MODBUS networks. The MODBUS over TCP/IP is implemented
by encapsulation MODBUS data in a TCP segment, TCP port 502 is assigned to
MODBUS protocol. In TCP MODBUS, slave devices listen for incoming connec-
tion on port 502 and act as servers, the master initiate a connection by generating
Application Data Unit (ADU), encapsulate it in TCP segment and send it over
the network. In TCP MODBUS a master can have parallel communication or
transaction; similarly a slave can also communicate with multiple master stations
[9]. The semantic of ADU and addressing is discussed later in this section. The
TCP/MODBUS defines four types of messages for communication purpose [9],
i MODBUS Request: The request initiated by Master to ask slave to perform
an action or request for information.
ii MODBUS Indication: The request message received by slave device or
server.
iii MODBUS Response: The message generated by server in response of MOD-
BUS request by client
iv MODBUS Confirmation: The response message received by client.
The communication with above mentioned messages between Modbus client
and Modbus server is show in 1.3.1.
8
Figure 1.2: MODBUS Communication Messages
The advantages of MODBUS over TCP/IP as compare to MODBUS over serial
include economic benefits and interpretability benefits. The TCP/IP networks are
ubiquitous, it save cost of dedicated point to point communication link or leased
lines, it also provide integration with different COTS application on the existing
network and any new device with TCP/IP stack installed can be connected to
TCP MODBUS network.
1.3.2 Distributed Network Protocol
DNP was originally created by Westronic, Inc. (now GE Harris) in 1990; it sets
out the rules for exchange of control commands and data between devices in
SCADA control system [10]. This protocol has been widely used in electric and
water companies [11]. DNP is a layered protocol but instead of adhering to seven
layers OSI model, it operates on simplified 3 layer standard proposed by the IEC
(International Electrotechnical Commission), which is known as Enhanced Per-
formance Architecture (EPA). The DNP3 can be implemented in various network
topologies which can be simple direct connection between master and outstation
or hierarchical design for complex networks. Three common network topologies
are shown in figure below. The top network topology is simple one on one con-
9
Figure 1.3: DNP 3.0 Network Topologies
nection between master and outstation, the connection between them can be a
dedicated line or dial up telephone line [11] [12]. In multi-drop design several
outstation is connected to a master station, it queries data from outstation in
round robin order. Every outstation listens to every request from master but only
permitted to respond to request that are addressed to it. The physical connection
between master and outstation is multi-dropped phone line, fiber optic or radio
[11]. In hierarchical device, a device acts as an outstation in one segment and
masters in another segment, this device also act as data concentrators or protocol
converter.
EPA model is consists of Application, Data link and Physical layer; however
DNP adds a fourth layer, pseudo transport layer for message segmentation. Each
layer function and semantics is discussed below.
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Physical Layer
The physical layer is responsible for managing physical media resources by mon-
itoring its states, maintaining synchronization, controlling voltage and etc. DNP
can be transported over different kind of media including fiber, copper, radio or
satellite. Recently DNP is also implemented specified over simplified serial physi-
cal layer using fiber, copper, radio or satellite. DNP can also be transported over
Ethernet or TCP/IP .
Data Link Layer
The data link layer manages the logical link between communicating devices,
ensuring the reliability by improving physical channel error characteristics . DNP3
adds a 10 byte header in every data link frame and 16 bit error checking for every
16 byte of the frame , the maximum size of data content is 250 bytes. Thus
maximum length of data link frame is 292 bytes.
Pseudo Transport Layer
This layer is responsible for managing message fragmentation and reassembly. It
is necessary to split application messages larger than one data link frame length
into multiple frames. To facilitate the reassembly and fragmentation, one byte
header is added to every frame. This byte is consists of three fields FIR,FIN and
Sequence number. The FIR and FIN fields indicate the first and final frames of the
indicated message, while the sequence keeps tracks the fragment, its incremented
for each successive frame.
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Figure 1.4: DNP 3.0 and EPA model
Application Layer
The application layer acts on the message received and respond with requested
data, it defines the roles of the master and outstation devices. The request mes-
sages are sent by master devices while an outstation can send solicited or unso-
licited messages. Typical master devices messages include request for performing
a task or request for data, an outstation message are reply to request, ACK,
NACK for acknowledgement purposes. It is possible that application layer frag-
ment messages that exceed the maximum allowed message fragment size (between
2048 and 4096 bytes).
1.4 Motivation and Objective
The introduction of information and communication technology (ICT) into In-
dustrial Control System (ICS) enhances their functionality. The enhancements
include better supervision and management of these networks. However, this en-
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hancement comes at the cost of the security vulnerabilities and threats. These
vulnerabilities are beside the inherent vulnerabilities in ICS e.g. vulnerable proto-
cols. The threats against ICS are legitimate, several attacks against these systems
were reported which compromise them. These attacks include Denial of Service
(DoS) and reconnaissance attacks. A brief description of such attacks is as follows,
i On Nov 8 2011 [13], a pump at central Illinois water system was shut down
remotely. The hackers gain remote access to the network of a water utility
with stolen credentials. They managed to shut down one water pump at the
facility. The forensic investigation has shown that a computer was hacked
from Russia and this attack damages the water pump [14]. This attack
exploits the hardcoded password vulnerability in the software of control
system.
ii A reconnaissance attack was launched on US electricity grid [15]. After gain-
ing access to the system, a back door and malicious software was installed.
The installed software had capabilities to inflict damage on the control sys-
tem. In 2008, an attack on electric left several power generation equipment
inoperable.
iii In January 2003, a nuclear power plant in Ohio, United State. An infection
disabled the safety system of a nuclear facility. The worm entered to the
nuclear plant corporate network through unsecure network of the contractor.
It infected one unpatched windows server in the plant network. Slammer
reportedly also affected communications on the control networks of at least
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five other utilities. It floods the network which forces the system to drop
legitimate control system traffic.
Beside the threats of the attack, human error is also one of the factors that result
in the undesired operation of the system. The operators of such systems have
to monitors numerous readings and alarms. They take corrective action when an
alarm is raised. Most of the approaches and techniques to secure the industrial
control system are adapted from data network security. These systems are fun-
damentally different from data network systems. The security approaches and
techniques include signature based intrusion detection system, anomaly detection
system using normal communication patterns, command and response patterns
and resource utilization profiles. These techniques detect the anomalous opera-
tion or attack after it occurred. The aim of this work is to propose an Anomaly
detection technique which will use physical properties of the system to detect
anomalous behavior of the system due to malicious behavior or fault, while incur-
ring minimum overhead. The proposed system detects the anomalous behavior of
a system before it enters into a dangerous state.
1.5 Research Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis are:
i. Dataset Modeling for Power Generation Process: One of the main problems
in research on security of the industrial control system is lacking of the real
dataset. The industries and industrial control system vendors are reluctant
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to share data about their systems. The reason behind this is to keep their
technologies and industrial process information confidential and out of hand
of hackers. In this research we developed a realistic dataset of the power
generation process based on the real data. We model the attack on the power
generation process through establishing the normal profile of the process. An
anomaly is defined as deviation from the normal profile.
ii. Detection of Attacks in ICS Using SVM: We use the support vector machine
to create the classification of the power generation operational data to dis-
tinguish between normal and anomalous operation of the power generation
plant. SVM are known for higher accuracy and less prone to over fitting.
iii. Detection of Attacks in ICS Using kNN: We propose k nearest neighbor al-
gorithm based anomaly detection system for industrial control networks. It
models the normal operation of the plant and detects anomalous operation
by comparing the future operational data with model. The proposed ap-
proach is subsequently tested with different value of k; analysis of its impact
on accuracy, false positive and false negative is also performed.
iv. Detection of Attacks in ICS Using C4.5: We apply decision tree based ap-
proach to create a classification of the power generation data that discrim-
inate between normal and anomalous operation of the power generation.
C.45 algorithm can be applied to both categorical and continuous data and
robust to noise.
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1.6 Thesis Outline
In chapter 2, extensive literature review is done on vulnerabilities in industrial
control system and related work on anomaly detection in industrial control sys-
tems. We also review machine learning techniques used in anomaly and intrusion
detection systems.
In chapter 3, the dataset of power generation plant, description of the param-
eters and feature selection using genetic algorithm is discussed. The normal and
attack definition is also established by base-lining of the selected features.
In chapter 4, 5 and 6, we study Support Vector Machine, k-Nearest Neighbor
and C4.5 respectively for anomaly detection in the industrial control system. The
performance analysis of these algorithms is evaluated by using attack detection
rate, accuracy and false positive rate.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The security of the Industrial Control Systems is critical for plant operations and
safety. Any disruptions in the services monitored and supervised through ICS
have adverse consequences. Typical services include power generation and distri-
bution, water treatment plant, nuclear facilities. Traditionally, SCADA system are
believed to be secure from external threats as they are not linked to external net-
works and used proprietary protocols. The introduction of Internet and commer-
cial applications has numerous benefits but also expose them to security threats
Furthermore the most prevalent SCADA communication protocols have inherent
security weakness due to lack of authentication, integrity check and encryption.
These weaknesses can be exploited to gain unauthorized access, overwrite running
configuration, and execute denial of service (DoS) and man-in-middle attack. In
this chapter extensive literature review is done on vulnerabilities of industrial
control systems and security approach to secure industrial control systems.
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2.1 Vulnerabilities in Industrial Control System
The integration of the latest information and communication technologies into
the industrial control system enhances its functionalities and connectivity. Once
isolated industrial control system are now tightly integrated with internet and
use the same network used by other TCP/IP devices. This integration exposes
these systems to all vulnerabilities of these technologies. ICS system used to
have proprietary software but current ICS uses commercial software with known
vulnerabilities for e.g. Microsoft Windows, SQL etc. Beside these vulnerabilities,
communication protocol and infrastructure of ICS lack basic security mechanism
such as authentication and integrity checks. These vulnerabilities expose ICS to
multitude of threats, which can result in catastrophic events. In this chapter
we discuss the security vulnerabilities in ICS infrastructure and communication
protocols and their impact if exploited. A literature survey of security measure
and approaches to secure these systems and brief overview of the machine learning
techniques used in our work is provided.
2.1.1 ICS Communication Protocol Vulnerabilities
The communication protocols of Industrial control system are designed to ensure
availability, reliability and timely execution of tasks. The majority of industrial
control communication protocol are designed and developed when security was
not the prime concern. This results in the inherent security vulnerabilities in
these protocols. Basic security features e.g. authentication, integrity check and
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time checks are missing in these protocols. These vulnerabilities if exploited can
results in the compromise of the system and providing complete control to the
attacker.
In [16][17], the vulnerabilities of two major communication protocol MODBUS
and DNP 3.0 of industrial control system are presented. Although the vulnera-
bilities are specific to these protocols but they are common among other commu-
nication protocols. The potential impact of these vulnerabilities, if exploited is
discussed below.
Lack of Authentication
The absence of the authentication mechanism can be exploited to gain unau-
thorized access of the system. This absence of authentication between master
and slave device can be exploited to send malicious command [18] [17]. These
commands will be executed by the slave device which can results in disruption
of service. This attack is demonstrated in [19], by sending the malicious com-
mand, which instruct the device to reset the counters. An implanted device can
be used to launch a denial of service attack on industrial control network. Due
to the lack authentication, this device can send meaningless data continuously
over the communication link [18]. This effectively saturates the communication
link and communication between master and slave device will be lost. Another
way to launch a DoS attack is to continuously send commands to a particular
device or node. The processing and execution of each command consume memory
and processing power of a device, continuous command execution will exhaust it
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resources. Generally these are resource constrained devices.
Lack of Confidentiality
The communication between devices in the industrial control system is done with-
out encryption. This vulnerability can be exploited to launch the reconnaissance
attack on the industrial control system. In this attack, an attacker can capture
the communication between devices on the network and can learn about the de-
vices architecture of the network. In [16] [19], this vulnerability is exploited to
capture data from the network. They were able to capture the messages between
devices. A typical message contains the field device address, response/request and
its associated data.
Lack of Integrity Check
The lack of confidentiality can be also be used to launch the man-in-middle (M-i-
M) attacks. A message can be capture, modified and retransmit to the addressed
device. Due to lack in integrity e.g. CRC, this modification is undetectable. This
kind of attack can be used to deceive the security mechanism where only trusted
device can send instruction to slave devices. This attack can be used to modify a
legitimate command to issue a malicious command. A successful M-i-M launched
by exploiting this vulnerability on a test bed [19].
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Figure 2.1: Man-in-the-middle attack
Replay Vulnerability
If the communication messages are not time stamped and does not have an expiry
limit, such protocols are susceptible to replay attack. The messages can be cap-
tured and stored. Such message can be retransmitted at later time to the devices.
This vulnerability can also be exploited to launch man in middle attack.
2.1.2 Supervisory Layer Vulnerabilities
An operator system is used to monitor and supervise industrial process. A com-
promised operator station can be proved lethal. This is one of entry point for an
attacker to launch an attack. Following are possible threats and vulnerabilities
present in an operator system. 1. The operator workstation have evolved into PCs
[20] and based on Windows Platform. It is known that Windows platform have
high number of known vulnerabilities and unpatched PC can be easily exploited.
2. The system can also be compromise due to weak Passwords, installation of
unauthorized software, connection to internet and absence or obsolete Anti-Virus.
3. The use of commodity hardware and software solution such as Microsoft Win-
dows, TCP/IP networking, SQL database are few example [21], this adoption is
mainly due to their low cost, high availability and high connectivity requirement.
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This exposes control systems to same vulnerabilities of these products, which can
be exploited to gain remote access of the system or perform illegal activities.
2.1.3 Field layer vulnerabilities
RTU are responsible for managing field devices, Programmable Logic Control
is commonly used to control filed devices and gather telemetric data. PLCs are
programmed by using software, for example STEP 7 by Siemens. The potential for
reprogramming an RTU or PLC by accessing the polling/communication circuit
exists. The attacker can replace the valid configuration file by malicious file [22].
This threat could be exploited in case of PLC dont provide means of authentication
or have hardcoded username and passwords in the firmware.
2.1.4 Communication Links Vulnerabilities
Communication links are integral part of Industrial Control Systems and provide
connectivity between remote sites. The remote sites can be connected through
dial-up link, leased lines, frame relay, wireless links, and wired links or through
internet. Following are the vulnerabilities or threats which can lead to intrusion
into an industrial control system network.
i War Dialing : Vendors and support staff use dial-in functionality to gain
administrative access to Industrial networks. They establish by using dial-up
functionality and authenticate by username and password [21]. War dialing
can be executed using scripts to dial surrounding numbers to establish a
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connection. The default username/password of the devices can be used,
which is set by the vendor of the device [22].
ii The communication links connecting remote sites are usually wireless links.
The wireless links are vulnerable to these communications hijacking [21].
The communication link between RTU and MTU can be hijacked by doing
the man in the middle attack. This attack could result in sending false
information to an operator. Any action based on this information could do
potential damage or interruption of process.
iii The sites which are connected through internet are more vulnerable and
highly susceptible to attacks. The TCP/IP protocol does not have any
inherent security mechanism against attack. If an adversary is able to gain
access of one computer/node, it can easily traverse through network. Worm
and viruses also exploit this functionality. The communication links are
also susceptible to electronic intrusion, signal jamming, RF eavesdropping,
sneaker net and etc.
2.1.5 Stuxnet
Stuxnet is a complex malware that target Industrial Control System networks. It
is specifically created for targeting Industrial Control Systems with the final goal
to reprogram the Programmable Logic Control (PLC) devices; which are used to
control the physical processes. Stuxnet is a highly targeted malware and only
infect specific types of PLCs, precisely Siemens PLCs with 315-2 CPU.
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STUXNET Architecture
Stuxnet has complex architecture and consists of different components. Mainly it
is a large .DLL file which contains different exports and resources. Each export
and resource has a distinct function in controlling and execution of the Stuxnet.
Exports are used to perform different tasks e.g. contacting command and control
center or infecting removable drives while resources is consist of drivers, exploits,
.DLL files, cabinet files and PLC root kit. Exports use these resources to control
the operation of the Stuxnet. Beside exports and resource, Stuxnet also contain
two encrypted configuration block. This configuration data instruct the Stuxnet
how to act on a comprised system.
STUXNET Infection and Installation
Initially STUXNET spreads through removable media and copying itself over
the network. It exploits two zero day vulnerabilities for network propagation.
These zero day vulnerabilities are related to printer spooler service and windows
server service. Once Stuxnet malware is dropped, its installation process starts.
The zero day exploits were used to escalate the privilege level to initiate the
infection process. The antivirus and intrusion detection software were unable
to detect this infection. The process for injection will be chosen according to
security software e.g. winlogon.exe for McAfee. Stuxnet will use this process
to call the export 16; responsible for Stuxnet installation. Once the infection
process is completed, it replaces the .DLL file of PLC programming software.
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Figure 2.2: Communication between PLC and Step 7 through infected .DLL
The infected .DLL enables Stuxnet to monitor the exchange between PLC and
programming device. It can also inject the malicious control program and hide it.
The Communication between PLC and Step 7 through infected .DLL is shown in
figure 2.2.
PLC Modification
The modification in the PLC control program is decided according to the devices
connected to it. Stuxnet has three control program configurations named A, B,
and C. Stuxnet only infects PLCs with 6ES7-315-2 CPU. The infected .DLL injects
the malicious code into the PLC to overwrite the current configuration.
Equipment Damage
The malicious code, damages the variable frequency converter drives attached to
PLCs. The infected sequence damages the drives by slowing or speeding up them
at different frequency which lies outside their normal operation range. The ma-
licious code changes the operating frequency periodically. The normal operating
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frequency between 807 Hz and 1210 Hz.
2.2 Related Work
The security of SCADA system can be achieved by two approaches: Securing the
perimeter of SCADA network by firewalls, Intrusion Detection System or Anti-
virus, the second method is to develop profiles of normal operation and detect
intrusions using these profiles [23]. The second approach can be further divided
on the basis of what feature sets are used in developing these normal operation
profiles. The feature sets can be related to protocol parameters, network traffic
pattern or measurements from physical process for e.g. pressure, speed, power
etc. The following section provides a detail survey on the research which uses
the physical properties of the control system. A survey about IDS or Anomaly
Detection System that use features like protocol parameter or network traffic
pattern are provided in the later section.
2.2.1 Physical Properties Based
Alavaro et al. [20] present their finding about incorporating physical system
knowledge enable them to identify critical sensors and attacks on them. They
modeled Tennessee-Eastman process control system (TE-PCS), which is responsi-
ble for controlling a chemical reaction with primary objective is to maintain pres-
sure around 3000 KPa. Three types of attacks, namely surge, bias and geometric
are modeled and launched on different sensors in the network. The detection
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method use by Alvaro et al. [20] is based on change detection by Cumulative
sum (CUSUM), which detect change between two Hypothesis (H0 and H1) in
minimum possible time. They find that DoS attacks dont force the control sys-
tem to operate in unsafe condition but however attacks on integrity of sensor do
force the change in pressure beyond safety limits. In [20], an automatic detection
module (ADM) is also proposed which replace sensor measurement by estimated
measurement by using linear model of system when an intrusion is detected.
In [24], a neural network based intrusion detection system (IDS) is proposed
for SCADA lab system for water tank storage. Their proposed IDS used four
features as input which includes parameters which presents physical states of the
system; water level, mode of operation and water tank pump state. Their attack
model consist of command and response injection into the SCADA network which
affects the integrity and DoS attacks which affects the availability aspect of the
SCADA network. They are able to achieve high accuracy for detecting command
& response injection and DoS attacks but have high number of false positive in
detecting replay attacks. The proposed IDS approach is designed for water storage
tank with a simple process to monitor we suspect that if the same approach is
applied to more complex system, the IDS accuracy may degraded.
Bigham J. et al. [23] proposed two approaches to enhance the accuracy of
anomaly detection in SCADA systems. Their first approach is based on N-gram
technique, which first records the normal operation of the SCADA network The
typical use of N-gram is to classify the text independently of language or error,
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but they used it model the normal operation of the electric network. It is done by
recording n-gram occurrence in a training set. The second approach is based on the
invariant induction which establishes mathematical relationship between different
data readings and uses these relationships to model the normal operation of the
electric network. It detects the corrupted measurement due to fault or attack by
evaluating it against mathematical model. They test the performance of their
purposed approach they used load flow program to record real and reactive power
flow measurement of six bus electric network of varying load for one year period.
They introduce 1 to 44 random errors in the calculated data files. In [23], they
concluded that invariant induction has better overall performance, while n-gram
is better in detecting corrupt files. It is also suggested to use correlation of two
or more anomaly detection techniques for further enhanced accuracy.
In [25], they extended the work proposed in [23] by using Bayesian based cor-
relation that correlate the output of two IDS. They used invariant induction and
artificial ant approach based IDS. They defined three invariant checkers for profil-
ing and anomaly detection. A similar approach is used for artificial ant approach
is adopted by clustering real and reactive powers to define normal operation of
electric network.
An ADS technique based on data rough set theory [26] is proposed for securing
the Electric Power System. A similar approach to [23] [27] is taken to profile the
normal operation by extracting rules from the normal operation and compare
incoming measurement from RTU to this normal profile. They have reduced the
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number of rules for anomaly detection which makes the rule dynamic and less
resource intensive. The experimentation is done on the six bus power system,
the data set is consist of reading of 45 test with 57 measurement values. The
errors are introduced on bus 4 and bus 6; they only introduce switch sign error
in their dataset. The rules for detection anomalies are based on the power flow
between the buses on the electrical network. After doing the literature survey for
anomaly or intrusion detection technique for electrical networks based on physical
properties, we found out that prime focus is detecting anomaly or intrusion from
generation output to distribution network and dont taking account the possibility
of attack at the machine side of the generating equipment.
2.2.2 Conventional IDS
Intrusion Detection techniques can be classified into signature based and anomaly
based. Signature based IDS analyze the network traffic against rules in their
databases, this require the prior knowledge of the exploits and vulnerabilities to
develop signature, due to this some unknown attacks can go undetected. The level
of sophistication of detection techniques in signature based IDS vary and could
be simple analysis of the particular fields in the network traffic to deep packet
inspection. Popular signature based IDS include Snort [28] and Bro [29]. On the
other hand anomaly based techniques detects suspicious events that dont match
the normal profile of the system, this helps in the detection of the unknown attacks.
The challenges in the anomaly based detection high number of false positive if the
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accurate profiling of normal operation is not done. In this section we discussed
research for IDS for control networks that use signatures, profiling or model based
approaches to detect intrusion attempts or attack on control networks.
Anomaly Based
In [30], an IDS is proposed that modeled the specification of the MODBUS/TCP;
they exploit the static nature of control system network topology and network
traffic pattern [30][31] . They proposed three techniques to detect intrusions on
the control network. The first approach is based on the protocol based specifi-
cation of the fields in the request and reply messages of MODBUS/TCP. They
have developed specification for function codes, exception codes, protocol identi-
fiers and cross field relationship specification for e.g. relationship between length
and function code. The second approach exploits the predictable communication
pattern in control systems; Snort [28] is used to detect suspicious communication
patter. The snort rules are developed based on the modeled communication pat-
tern in MODBUS/TCP based network. In the third approach they used heuristics
to learn the availability of the server and clients on the system; this helps them
in identifying rogues devices and changing network services. An appliance based
on these techniques is integrated into control system test bed, initial experiment
produce promising results and provide evidence that model based approach can
be used to effectively detection anomalous behavior in control systems.
As mentioned in [30], inaccurate model of the system produce high number of
false positives, an accurate modeling for MODBUS/TCP protocol is proposed in
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[31] and an IDS is designed to detect attacks. They have used Moor Deterministic
Finite Automata with four tuple features; function code, Response/ Query indi-
cation, reference number and count, to model normal operation between HMI and
PLC. Their proposed IDS performed deep packet inspection and produce detail
network profile. They did not inject any kind of malicious packets into their sys-
tem and considered faults due to misconfiguration and troubleshooting, under this
condition the experimental results shows that the false positive rate is very low.
They have claimed of zero false alarms for monitoring MODBUS/TCP network
for 111 hours.
Yang et al [32] proposed an Anomaly based IDS for control system. Their
proposed system is based on Auto-Associative Kernel Regression (AAKR) model
and Statistical Probability Ratio test (SPRT). They have simulated the SCADA
system by establishing a local network of SUN servers and use SNMP to collect
the data from devices on the local network; the monitored parameters include
link utilization, CPU usage, and login failure. They used Continuous System
Telemetry Harness (CSTH), to monitor the network and establish the base profile
of the normal working condition. This base line profiles are classified by time
of day, day of week and special days such as weekend and holidays. They used
the monitored feature as input to Auto-Associative Kernel Regression (AAKR)
model to predict the normal behavior; the incoming data is then compared with
this predicted normal behavior. The residual of this comparison is an indicative
of the abnormal behavior. These residual are than fed into Statistical Probability
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Ratio test (SPRT), this determine whether this deviation from normal traffic is due
to normal or abnormal distribution by comparing it to predetermined limits of the
parameters. They have considered DoS attacks, ping ood, jolt2 attacks, bubonic
attacks, simultaneous jolt2 and bubonic attacks to demonstrate the working of
the proposed Intrusion Detection System.
Another Anomaly based Intrusion Detection system is proposed in [33], their
approach is based on bloom filters. They considered the typical master-slave
topology of the control system with MODBUS as the communication protocol and
considered only external threats which are primarily attacks on the integrity of
the system. The threat model includes man in the middle attack and compromise
of the operator station with HMI to send disruptive commands to devices. They
have considered function code and data as the parameter for establishing normal
profile. They use n-gram analysis to extract these parameters from the traffic;
the extracted information is act as an input to bloom filters. Each bloom filter is
assigned with weight, in their implementation they have assigned equal weight 0.5
to each bloom filter, cumulative score of these two bloom filters is used for anomaly
detection and decision. An enhancement to their approach is done by adding
physical operating mode of the plant to anomaly decision making process. The
physical operating condition can be either of normal, emergency and restorative.
They used these states to detect anomalous behavior of devices in particular state
condition for example repeated restarting of devices in normal state is anomalous
behavior while it could be seen as normal behavior in restorative mode.
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An anomaly based IDS is proposed in [34] which detect intrusion by establish-
ing network traffic flow model and relationship between them, their proposed IDS
is intended to automatically generates flow models and detect anomalies in net-
work traffic that violate the established traffic flow model. The generation of all
possible network is very difficult task for typical IP network due to diversity of de-
vices, protocols and other multiple factor but in case of network model for SCADA
it is possible to generate all possible traffic flow in SCADA network because of
limited number of devices, protocols and regular communication pattern. The
implementation and results of proposed IDS [34] is presented in [35] along with
the challenges in modeling SCADA traffic, they used traditional five tuple pro-
tocol number, source and destination IP addresses and port numbers to generate
network traffic flow information. Their dataset is comprises of the data from two
SCADA facilities that also have corporate network. The field network contains
Programmable Logic Control (PLC) and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) devices.
They used invariants for analyzing the SCADA network traffic. These invariants
includes diurnal pattern of activity which describe network traffic based on time
and weekdays, Log-normal connection sizes and Heavy-tail distributions which
describe connection size distribution and self-similarity, in which whole message
resemble the parts of the message . Their finding concludes that SCADA network
have regular patterns and periodic in nature and both lognormal and heavy dont
provide good fit for the SCADA connection size. They concluded that existing
traffic models cannot be easily applied to SCADA traffic.
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An anomaly detection system is proposed in [36], which analyze payload to
detect anomalies and able to detect exploit based unknown attacks. The proposed
IDS is consisting of four modules, namely a network sensor, a feature extractor, a
similarity processor and the anomaly detection component. The network sensor
is consist of Bro IDS which capture transport layer packets and reassemble it, the
feature extractor received reassemble data and extract byte sequence and map it
in a multidimensional feature space. The similarity processor analyzes the byte
sequences and find similarities between them, which is decide on the distance
between two sequences. Once the similarities are found, the new incoming data
is analyzed by Anomaly detection system, it tries to fit the captured data with
established byte sequence model and dissimilarities are presented as anomalies.
The experiments are done for Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Remote
Procedure Call (RPC), the accuracy rate for HTTP rate is 88 % while 92 % for
RPC traffic with false positive rate of 0.2% for both protocols.
Signature Based
An Intrusion Detection System for DNP 3 protocol is proposed in [37] which
uses Bro [bro2008homepage], a network analysis framework. The proposed sys-
tem modified the Bro and consists of three main components a network parser,
an event handler and a Policy script interpreter which has protocol validation
policy. The network packet parser is responsible for decoding incoming packet
to byte stream as per DNP3 protocol specification and semantic information for
each event. The event handler act as an interface between DNP3 parser and pol-
34
icy script interpreter. Event handlers are specified for each type of data field of
DNP3 protocol. The protocol validation policy (PVP) is responsible to look for
protocol specification violations, DNP3 protocol introduce some strict dependen-
cies between different fields. The protocol validation policy performs two types
of validation, inter-packet validation and intra-packet validation. In inter-packet
validation looks for anomalous communication patterns, for e.g. unmatched re-
quest/reply, the system can keep the history of states from parsed network pack-
ets. This type of validation helps in detecting DoS and replay attacks. The
Intra-packet validation is validates the dependencies between different data fields
to detect malformed packets which can causes DoS, for e.g. an anomalous packet
can have mismatch of length field and actual length of the real pay load. A
simulated SCADA test bed is implemented for experimental purposes; they eval-
uate each module of the proposed system. They have conducted robustness and
throughput testing in experiments but dont test their system for malicious activ-
ity. The system is robust to malformed packets and throughput of the system
stands at 9247 packets/second. The proposed schemes or solution for the secu-
rity of industrial control systems in this section will be able to detect anomalies
or intrusion if it violates protocol specifications, normal communication patterns,
and resource utilization profiles. The proposed schemes will not able to detect if
a normal command with malicious value is send to the controlled devices. The
command will satisfy protocol specification, communication patterns and the re-
source utilization of the devices will also be not affected. Signature based IDS are
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not able to detect new attacks because of non-availability of signatures.
2.3 Machine Learning
2.3.1 Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) has recently been introduced as a new technique,
which perform binary classification of the data. SVM is an implementation of
Vapniks’s [38]structural risk minimization (SRM) principle. It plots the train-
ing vectors in highly dimensional feature space and creates a decision boundary
between the classes. The features near to this decision boundary are known as
support vectors. SVM perform classification on linearly separable data, in case of
data which cannot linearly separable SVM use kernel function. The kernel func-
tion maps the data into high dimensional feature space to linearize the data. The
various kernel functions can be used, such as linear, polynomial or Gaussian.
2.3.2 K-Nearest Neighbor
K-nearest neighbor (kNN) is a type of non-parametric classifier and special case
of instance based classifier [39]. The kNN is trained is with the labelled training
objects and classification of test object is done by computing the approximate
distances or similarity between test object and the training object. The distance
determines the nearest neighbor to the test object and the class of the K-nearest
neighbor is assigned to the test object. The common distance calculation methods
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are Euclidean and Manhattan [40] as shown in the equations below.
d(x, y) =
√
n∑
k=1
(xk − yk)2
d(x, y) =
√
n∑
k=1
|xk − yk|
Beside these, other distance calculation methods can be used for specific problems.
Euclidean distance method is used in the proposed ADS. The value of k is also
an important parameter; it determines the number of neighbor to be included in
the nearest neighbor list. Smaller value of k make the scheme sensitive to noise
whereas larger value will include object from other classes. The optimal value of
the k can be obtained by cross-validation.
2.3.3 C4.5 Decision Tree
Classification tree is a prediction mode in machine learning, and it is also called
Decision tree. It is tree pattern graph similar to flow chart structure; any internal
node is a test property, each branch represents test result, and final nodes of leaves
represent distribution situation of various types. C4.5 algorithm is a type of a
decision tree which summaries training data in the form of a decision tree. Decision
tree algorithms have proved popular due to their robustness and execution speed.
It uses training data to build a decision tree. C4.5 employs a greedy approach
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that uses an information theoretic measure as its guide. An attribute for root
of the tree is chosen that divides the training instances into subsets. . It uses
the gain ratio criterion in selecting the attribute for the root of the tree. The
gain ratio criterion selects, from among those attributes with an average-or-better
gain, the attribute that maximizes the ratio of its gain divided by its entropy.
If the entropy of the class labels in these subsets is less than the entropy of the
class labels in the full training set, then information has been gained through
splitting on the attribute. The entropy is calculated by a function. The algorithm
is applied recursively to form sub-trees, terminating when a given subset contains
instances of only one class.
2.3.4 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic Algorithm is a type of inductive learning strategy that is inspired by the
process of natural evolution and selection. Genetic Algorithm was by John Hol-
land and his aides in 1975. Genetic algorithm initiate with the randomly selected
chromosome with an objective function or problem to solve. Each chromosome is
evaluated for the fitness score with respect to the given problem. The fitness score
of a chromosome is calculated by using an evaluation function. The chromosomes
with highest fitness score are selected to produce offsprings. This production is
done by using one of two main genetic operators namely crossover and mutation.
In crossover a point is selected in parent gene structure and exchange the remain-
ing segment of the parent to create new offspring. Mutation is done by changing
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Figure 2.3: Gene Mutation
one or more component of a selected individual.
2.3.5 Best First Algorithm
Best rst search [41] is an AI search strategy that allows backtracking along the
search path. Like greedy hill climbing, best rst moves through the search space by
making local changes to the current feature subset. However, unlike hill climbing,
if the path being explored begins to look less promising, the best rst search can
back-track to a more promising previous subset and continue the search from
there. Given enough time, a best rst search will explore the entire search space,
so it is common to use a stopping criterion. Normally this involves limiting the
number of fully expanded subsets that result in no improvement.
2.3.6 The Ripper System
The RIPPER System is probably the most popular technique representing this
class. RIPPER [42]is a fast rule learning technique that generates concise rule
sets. The system uses a set of rules and patterns that can prove realistic for
classification for network traffic. The rule set generated by the system is simple
and allows multiple rule sets to be created and used with a meta-classifier.
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CHAPTER 3
DATASET, FEATURE
SELECTION AND
BASE-LINING
3.1 Introduction
In our research, we have used data of a turbine-generator operation from power
generation plant. The purposed solution is a threshold based anomaly detection
system. The threshold is based on the operational limits and average of a param-
eter. The dataset is evaluated using support vector machine (SVM), k-Nearest
Neighbor (kNN) and C4.5 decision tree. In the following sections we describe each
step of the experiment in details.
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3.2 Feature Selection
The genetic algorithm is an efficient algorithm for feature selection where size of
the feature set to save maximum information of the original dataset and the per-
formance of the system is important. The goal of the feature subset selection is
to identify and select a useful subset of features to in a larger set of often possibly
irrelevant, mutually redundant, attributes with different associated measurement
costs and/or risks. It can be presented as binary decision problem, in which each
feature in the potential feature subset is considered as a binary gene and each
individual consists of fixed-length binary string representing some subset of the
given feature set. An individual of length x corresponds to a x-dimensional binary
feature vector Y, where each bit represents the elimination or inclusion of the as-
sociated feature. It implies, x(i) = 0 represents elimination and x(i) = 1 indicates
inclusion of the ith feature.
The main advantage of feature selection is improvement in the performance of the
classification algorithm by reducing the complexity. This result in efficient and
robust rules formation for classifying object into their respective class.
Each row in our dataset is comprised of 18 parameters related to temperature,
pressure, electrical and safety indicators. The timing are very strict so it is not
feasible to use all the parameters to identify anomalies. This is due to high incom-
ing data rate and timely execution of all the processes in industrial applications.
Feature selection is carried on dataset to reduce the number of features to dif-
ferentiate normal and anomalous industrial operation. Genetic algorithm is used
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to identify important attributes/features in the dataset. Features that affect the
power output of the turbine-generator are selected using Genetic algorithm. The
feature space reduced from eighteen to five important features which greatly affect
power production, which are as follows,
i Fuel Gas Flow(Fuel GF): It is the amount of gas input to the combustion
chamber. Its value varies as per the power requirement.
ii Main Shaft Vibration(MSV): It is the shaft vibration intensity. It is very
important parameter, any great deviation from normal operation can per-
sistently damage the turbine-generator system.
iii Gearbox Vibration(GBV): It is similar safety indicator as Main Shaft Vi-
bration.
iv Exhaust gas temperature: It is temperature of turbine exhaust, which varies
with the power output of the generator. It needs be monitored because ex-
cessive exhaust temperature can also damage the turbine-generator system.
v Several other parameters such Compressor discharge pressure, Lube oil sup-
ply Temperature directly affect power output of a turbine-generator system.
Therefore, power is also selected to identify abnormal operations in this
process.
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3.3 Dataset
Each parameter of turbine-generator system should fall in pre-defined range to
ensure normal system operation. The power requirement varies during different
times of the day. The static nature of these processes can be used to model the
normal operation behavior of the Gen-set.
The baseline parameters are established using the historical data from a power
generation plant. The data set division is based on different power demand pat-
terns during different time intervals. The dataset division is as follows:
i Group 1: 0600-1200 (Morning)
ii Group 2: 1200-1800 (Afternoon)
iii Group 3: 1800-2400 (Evening)
iv Group 4: 2400-0600 (Night)
The dataset was created for each group on the basis of attack sensitivity.
Datasets are classified as follow,
i Highly Sensitive: A dataset row is labeled as an attack if any one of the
selected parameter is compromised. This is labeled as X 1P, where X is
group Number.
ii Medium Sensitive: A dataset row is labeled as an attack if any three of the
selected parameters are compromised. This is labeled as X 3P, where X is
group Number.
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iii Least Sensitive: A dataset row is labeled as an attack if all of the selected
parameters are compromised. This is labeled as X 5P, where X is group
Number.
Figure 3.1: Average Power Demand
3.4 Testing Scenarios
To evaluate the performance of our proposed ADS, six testing scenarios are consid-
ered per dataset group. The difference between each testing scenarios is based on
number of parameters considered for anomaly detection and total number of pa-
rameters in the dataset. These testing scenarios are as follow, 1. Highly Sensitive:
A dataset row is labeled as an attack if any one of the parameter is compromised.
2. Medium Sensitive: A dataset row is labeled as an attack if any three of the pa-
rameter is compromised. 3. Least Sensitive: A dataset row is labeled as an attack
all five of the parameter is compromised. The testing scenarios can be divided
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into two classes namely reduced dataset and full dataset. The reduced dataset is
consisting of the datasets with parameter that were selected from the full dataset
using feature selection algorithms. The second class is consisting of datasets with
all the parameter of the original dataset. This is done to evaluate the impact of
the feature selection on the performance of the ADS. Three scenarios are selected
for each class. These testing scenarios are shown in figure 3.2
Figure 3.2: Testing Scenarios.
3.5 Base-Lining/Profiling
For each parameter maximum, minimum, trimmeans and thresholds values are
calculated. Trimmeans were used instead of normal averages to exclude the outlier
values, affecting the average. This helps in protecting the normal profile from an
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attacker attempting to manipulate by sending periodic malicious values. It also
protects the normal profile because of system faults.
An equation is developed for determining the threshold for each parameter as
show in equation (3.1). The threshold is not static and incorporate the changing
operational conditions.
T = ((
OL− A
OL
) ∗ A) + A (3.1)
where T is equal to Threshold for a parameter, OL is operational limit of
parameter and A is trim-mean of the parameter. A parameter is considered to be
compromised if its value exceeds the established threshold as per equation 3.1.
X = (
OL− A
OL
) (3.2)
The percentage difference (X) of operational limit and trimmean is calculated
using equation (3.2). This percentage is used to calculate tolerance region between
trimmean and threshold. If the average value of a parameter is close to its oper-
ational limit, its tolerance region will be smaller as compared to a higher average
value. For small tolerance region, small variation will result in an anomaly.
Sample rows of the dataset used and normal values of selected parameters are
shown in Table 3.1, whereas Table 3.2 shows the anomalous values. These tables
include operational limits of each parameter, computed thresholds, normal values
and anomalous values. The anomalous values are shown in bold italics.
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Table 3.1: Normal Operation
Parameter Ex. Gas Temp MST GBV Fuel GF Power
OL 560 45 5 500 1120
Threshold 532 18.75 2.50 445 1032
469 10.51 1.43 329 918
416 11.62 1.56 319 834
433 10.90 1.40 362 800
458 12.42 1.60 371 819
Table 3.2: Anomalous Operation
Parameter Ex. Gas Temp MST GBV Fuel GF Power
OL 560 45 5 500 1120
Threshold 532 18.75 2.50 445 1032
High Sensitive 470 12.636 1.365 484 884
Med. Sensitive 547 10.998 1.425 474 1078
Low Sensitive 557 23.51 4.56 447 1103
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CHAPTER 4
ANOMALY DETECTION IN
INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEM USING SUPPORT
VECTOR MACHINE
4.1 Introduction
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine learning system that
has been widely employed for intrusion detection in the past. It is a binary
classification algorithm that plots the training vectors in high dimensional feature
space, separating the set of training vectors into two separate classes. The training
samples close to a decision boundary constitute the support vectors. The SVM
also enables users to balance between the number of misclassified samples and the
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width of a decision boundary through a parameter called penalty factor. We utilize
SVM in this research work due to its good generalization ability of the learning
model. This implies that good accuracy can be achieved even with relatively
smaller training datasets with SVM. Another advantage of SVM is its ability to
handle a large number of features. In addition, SVM also ensures high accuracy
for classification of future data from the same allotment to which the training data
belongs. SVMs do not involve any reduction in the number of features and are
free from the problem of over-fitting. Experimental results obtained confirm high
accuracy of attack detection and insignificant false positive rates for the proposed
approach.
4.2 Support Vector Machine
Support vector machines (SVMs)[43] belong to the class of supervised knowledge
based systems that project the input vectors in feature space of large dimensions,
assigning each vector a label. Data is categorized by SVMs by selecting a group of
support vectors which are part of training inputs that outline a hyper plane in the
feature space [38]. SVMs are known exhibit desirable results for both two-class
and multi-class classification.
4.2.1 Two-Class Classification
For a two-class linearly separable data, SVM works by creating a hyperplane which
divides the binary classes of the specified dataset with the largest margin. This
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allows for the best generalization ability [43] Generalization ability is defined as
the ability of the classifier to ensure classification accuracy for both training data
and future data as well. The degree of separation between two classes is outlined
with the help of a margin. Figure 4.1 below illustrates an optimal hyperplane for
a two-class classification, where two different classes are represented: normal class
(blue circles) and attack class (red circles).
Figure 4.1: Support Vector Machine hyperplane for two input class
The objective of SVM here is to separate the two different classes by creating
a linear boundary (solid line) that expands the margin (space between dashed
lines) between the classes. As a result the data points that are found to be closest
to the margin (circles on the dotted line) are called support vectors. The classifier
is defined based on these support vectors. The model presented in Figure 4.1[44]
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is valid for linearly separable data.
Mathematically, the linear boundary can be expressed as [45]:
wTx + b = 0 (4.1)
The classification problem using the training set can be estimated using a
function f : Rn 7→ {±1}. We present the normal class with x ∈ normal, y = 1
and the attack class with x ∈ attack, y = −1; {xi, yi} ∈ RnX{±1}. If the training
data can be linearly separated then there exists a pair (w, b) ∈ RnXR such that
wTxi + b ≥ +1 xi ∈ normal (4.2)
wTxi + b ≤ −1 xi ∈ anomalous (4.3)
Therefore, the decision rule is given by
f(w, b)x = sign(w
Txi + b) (4.4)
where w is the weight vector and b is the bias.
The optimal separating hyperplane that provide the largest margin between
two classes can be found by minimizing squared norm of separating hyperplane.
[
1
2
||w||2] (4.5)
In cases where SVM is unable to separate the binary classes, a kernel function
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is employed by SVM to plot the input vectors into n-dimensional feature spaces.
The kernel function can be either linear, polynomial, or Gaussian. The number
of parameters used by SVM is defined by the margin that splits the data points.
This makes the SVMs free from the problem of over-fitting as they do not need
any reduction in the number of feature. In addition, the prospect of generalization
errors in SVMs is quite small. After classification is completed, an appropriate
optimization process can be applied for identification of additional features if
necessitated by the application [46].
4.2.2 Multi-Class Classification
Although, originally designed for binary classification, Support Vector Machines
have recently been applied to the multi-class input space as well. Two main SVM
schemes can be identified for classification of multi-class data, namely, one-against-
all and one-against-one [47]. The one-against-all approach works by assembling
and merging several binary classiers. On the other hand, one-against-one for-
mulates all data into one optimization problem. Further details on multi-class
classication can be obtained from [48].
4.3 Result and Analysis
The training of the algorithms is done on the 25% of the randomly selected
data.The smaller training set is used because of less number of attack types.
Similar approach is used in [31] where minimal training is done for an Intrusion
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Detection System (IDS). Despite smaller training set, the proposed ADS able to
perform efficiently. Each instance of the trained dataset is labelled as normal or
anomalous. The labeling of the training dataset is done according to following
criteria,
i anomalous (1)
ii normal activity (0)
The implementation of the SVM is done through Matlab. The total of 18 features
are used to train SVM in all features based anomaly detection whereas five selected
feature by feature selection algorithms are used to train SVM in reduced feature
set based anomaly detection. The performance evaluation of the proposed system
is done by using three important factors [49] these are as follows,
i attack detection rate (ADR)
ii false positive rate (FPR)
iii system accuracy (Acc)
The experiments tested attack detection rate, false positive rate and accuracy
among full dataset and reduced feature input to SVM . The results of the exper-
iment are presented for each type of sensitivity to attack i.e. High sensitive(1P),
medium sensitivity (3P) and low sensitivity (5P). The experimental results for
each group are presented below for each type of approach along with their aver-
ages.
53
High Sensitivity (1 Parameter)
The experimental results for the proposed approach with one parameter based
anomaly detection are summarized in table 4.1. The achieved average accuracy
with reduced dataset is 87.8% where as it is 71.3% for full dataset based approach.
Performance degradation was observed for group 2 as the detection accuracy
dropped to 80.6%. The minimum accuracy with full dataset based approach is
57.8% for group 4. This low detection accuracy is observed due to similarity
between normal and anomalous data.
The average attack detection rate for the reduced data set based approach
is 85%. The full dataset based approach achieved the maximum attack detec-
tion rate of 55.6% with the average detection rate of 46.7%. The average false
positive rate with reduced dataset input is 11.3% whereas with the full dataset
it is 20.6%. Group 4 showed the maximum false positive rate of 41.5% for full
dataset.The precision rate for one parameter based approach with reduced dataset
is approximately 90% while it is 80% for the full dataset based approach.
Table 4.1: SVM 1 Parameter Results
Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 6.7 20.7 6.7 11.1 23.7 11.9 5.2 41.5
Acc 87.8 80.6 93.3 89.4 71.1 75.6 80.6 57.8
ADR 71.1 84.4 93.3 91.1 55.6 37.8 37.8 55.6
Precision 93.3 79.3 93.3 88.9 76.3 88.1 94.8 58.5
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Medium Sensitivity (3 Parameter)
The experimental results improved greatly by increasing the number of parameters
for anomaly detection. The ideal accuracy of 100% was archived for group 2
and group 3 with reduced dataset. The average accuracy is also very close to
ideal. Another benefit is ideal false positive rate of zero across all groups. The
attacks detection rate also improved from 85% to approx. 98%. These improved
results are due to improved discrimination criteria between normal and anomalous
data. Similar results are observed for full dataset approach. Its average accuracy
increased to 92.1% from 71.3% but its attack detection rate still very low. The
maximum achieved attack detection rate is 77.8% but average is 68.9%. Similar
to reduce dataset approach the false positive rate is very close to ideal condition.
The optimum precision rate is achieved with three parameter based approach for
both full and reduced dataset based approach. In this approach, increasing the
parameter increase the accuracy and false positive rate but the attack detection
rate still not appropriate for real industrial control system. The poor attack
detection rate is due to poor discriminating criteria which are due to and weak
support vectors in hyperplane.
Table 4.2: SVM 3 Parameter Results
Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
Acc 98.9 100.0 100.0 98.9 89.4 94.4 93.3 91.1
ADR 95.6 100.0 100.0 95.6 57.8 77.8 75.6 64.4
Precision 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.3 100.0
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Low Sensitivity (5 Parameter)
The ideal attack detection rate, accuracy and false positive rate were achieved
across all groups with reduced data set as shown in Table 4.3. As the classes in
the data set are either normal or anomalous, SVM is easily able to establish an
optimal hyper-plane between normal and anomalous class.
Improved results were also observed with the full data set. The average ac-
curacy was found to be 93.2% with minimal false positive rate across all groups.
However, the attack detection rate with this approach is still not optimal. Despite
improvement in some groups, the average attack detection shows insignificant im-
provement. The maximum attack detection rate is 84.4% for group 1 but the
average attack detection rate is approx. 72.8%. The optimal precision rate for
reduced dataset is maintained in this test case. However there is a decline in pre-
cision rate for full dataset based approach but the attack detection rate increases.
SVM Results Summary
The obtained results signify that increasing the number of parameters for anomaly
detection improves the performance of the system. For all test scenarios the data
set with reduced feature set was observed to outperform the full feature data
set. The results from 5 parameter based approach exhibit ideal statistics but this
approach is also known to be least sensitive to the attacks. On the other hand
the one parameter based approach is highly sensitive to attacks but suffers from
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low accuracy and attack detection rate. Its performance can also degrade due
to noise which is quite common in industrial control system. The 3 Parameter
based approach provides a balance between sensitivity to attack and performance
characteristics. It has ideal false positive rate, high accuracy and attack detection
rate. The comparison of accuracy, attack detection rate and false positive between
reduced data set approach and full data set based approach is show in figures 4,5
and 6
Table 4.3: SVM 5 Parameter Results
Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Acc 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.1 93.9 91.7 91.1
ADR 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 84.4 75.6 66.7 64.4
Precision 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Figure 4.2: Average False Positive Rate for SVM
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Figure 4.3: Average Accuracy for SVM
Figure 4.4: Average Attack Detection Rate for SVM
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Figure 4.5: Average Precision for SVM
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CHAPTER 5
ANOMALY DETECTION IN
INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEM USING K-NEAREST
NEIGHBOR
5.1 Introduction
The k nearest neighbor (kNN) algorithm is a well-known machine learning
methodology characterized by good performance and a short training period. It
is also commonly known as a lazy learning algorithm as learning does not initiate
until the test sample is provided [1]. It is a complex algorithm capable of handling
a large number of attributes and a large-scale dataset.
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5.2 k-Nearest Neighbor
K nearest neighbor is an instance based learning algorithm. The instance based
learning algorithms are lazy-learning algorithms because the generalization pro-
cess does not start until classification is performed. Unlike the inductive learning
approach, it does not contain the model training stage. This results in the less
computational resources during the training phase but more computation is re-
quired during classification. The working principle of the k-Nearest neighbor
algorithm based on the assumption that instance of the same class generally lie
in close to each other. The label of the unknown instance can be determined by
examining the class of the closest neighbors. In kNN the nearest neighbors to
the query instance (unknown instance) are obtained by calculating the distance
unknown instance and known instance. The objective is to find the single most
frequent class label, the unknown instance is then labeled with frequent class la-
bel. The pseudo code of the kNN algorithm is illustrated below. The algorithm
on how to compute the K-nearest neighbors is as follows,
 Determine the parameter K = number of nearest neighbors beforehand. This
value is all up to you.
 Calculate the distance between the query-instance and all the training sam-
ples. You can use any distance algorithm.
 Sort the distances for all the training samples and determine the nearest
neighbor based on the K-th minimum distance.
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 Since this is supervised learning, get all the Categories of your training data
for the sorted value which fall under K.
 Use the majority of nearest neighbors as the prediction value.
The instances are considered as points within an n-dimensional space, in which
each direction corresponds to one of the n-features that describe an instance. The
relative distance between unknown instance and known instance is calculated by
using a distance metric. The objective of the distance metric is to minimize the
distance between the two point of same class, while maximize the distance between
different class. The most common distance formula are Euclidean and Manhattan
as shown in equations 5.1 and equation 5.2 respectively,
d(x, y) =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
(xk − yk)2]
d(x, y) =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
|xk − yk|
However other distance metric are also used for special problems. To enhance
the accuracy of the kNN, weighting scheme is used to influence the distance mea-
surement and voting of each instance. In the kNN, the choice of k influences the
performance of the algorithm. The kNN algorithm performance is also suscepti-
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ble to the presence of the noise. If the unknown instance is located in the noisy
region, the noisy instance will be in majority. This results in wrong labeling of
the unknown instance, which degrades the performance of the algorithm. The
effect of noise becomes insignificant with increasing value of the k. The experi-
ment conducted in [1], concludes that kNN performance is not sensitive to noise
when k was large. The small values of k are more robust on the most of datasets.
However, 1NN out performs kNN on small datasets.
5.3 Result and Analysis
The training and testing criteria is same as described in SVM and it is also im-
plemented in Matlab.
High Sensitivity (1 Parameter)
The results for each group based on the one parameter based approach are shown
in Table 5.1. It can be confirmed from the results that kNN does not work well
with either reduced data set based approach or full data set based approach. The
attack detection rate is very low for both cases. For reduced data set the maximum
attack detection rate is approx. 38%, which is obtained for group 3. The achieved
average detection rate is 29%. The full data set based approach shows similar
trend but the average attack detection rate is only 17%. In addition to low attack
detection rate, this approach also has considerable high false positive rate. The
average false positive rate is 15.5% for reduced data set based anomaly detection
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where as it reaches to 28% when full data set is used. The full dataset based
approach suffers from low precision rate of 71% while full dataset have precision
rate of 85%.
Figure 5.1: Average False Positive Rate for kNN
Consequently, the accuracy of both approaches was affected. The maximum
accuracy for reduced data set is 75.5% for group 3. This group also has highest
attack detection rate. The average accuracy is 70.5% for reduced data set whereas
it is 58% for full data set.
Table 5.1: kNN 1 Parameter Results
Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 14.1 18.5 11.9 17.8 32.6 23.0 34.1 23.0
Accuracy 70.6 69.4 75.6 66.7 55.6 61.1 52.8 62.8
ADR 24.4 33.3 37.8 20.0 20.0 13.3 13.3 20.0
Precision 85.9 81.5 88.1 82.2 67.4 77.0 65.9 77.0
64
Medium Sensitivity (3 Parameter)
Improved results are obtained for reduced features based approach when number
of parameters for anomaly detection is increased to three. The maximum attack
detection rate is increased to 77.8% whereas the average is improved to 74.4%.
However, the attack detection rate does not meet the requirements of safety of
real industrial control system. The full data set based approach still suffers from
low attack detection rate. The average attack detection rate is 26.67% , which is
only about 10% better than what obtained with 1 parameter. Similarly accuracy
and false positive rate also show improvement using this approach. The minimum
false positive rate achieved for reduced feature set is 3.7% but average is 9.8%.
The average accuracy improves to 86.25%. In case of full data set based approach
the average accuracy increased by 8% to 66%. The precision rate shows improve-
ment for both full datastet and reduced dataset based approach. The average
precision rate for reduced dataset based approach is 90% while the full dataset
based approach achieved 80% of the precision rate.
Table 5.2: kNN 3 Parameter Results
Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 16.3 3.7 8.1 11.1 20.0 22.2 25.2 16.3
Acc. 81.7 89.4 88.3 85.6 66.7 65.6 62.2 69.4
ADR 75.6 68.9 77.8 75.6 26.7 28.9 24.4 26.7
Precision 83.7 96.3 91.9 88.9 80.0 77.8 74.8 83.7
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Figure 5.2: Average Accuracy for kNN
Low Sensitivity (5 Parameter)
Similar to SVM, the proposed approach with feature reduction produces ideal
accuracy, false positive, attack detection rate and precision. The distance between
a test sample and its neighbors will be calculated such that the test sample is
always assigned the class of the training sample that is at minimum distance from
it. As all training samples are either categorized as normal or anomalous, the
distance between the normal and anomalous is always large.
The full data set based approach for 5 parameters did not show considerable
improvement in attack detection rate. However, the maximum attack detection
rate improved by only 2% whereas the average is 29.4%. In this case an attack
row consists of 18 parameters with five of them in anomalous region. The distance
calculated between the testing sample and the training data will also consider the
13 normal features. The incorrect nearest neighbor is found in this result. This
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Figure 5.3: Average Attack Detection Rate for kNN
is due to the decrease in the false positive rate. The average false positive rate is
14.4% and the average accuracy improves to 71.5%. The average precision in this
case for full dataset based approach is 85%.
Table 5.3: kNN 5 Parameter Results
Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.6 7.4 23.7 14.1
Acc. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 73.3 77.2 63.9 71.7
ADR 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 31.1 31.1 26.7 28.9
Precision 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 87.4 92.6 76.3 85.9
kNN Results Summary
The results obtained for kNN are similar to those obtained with SVM. Increasing
the number of parameters for kNN also lead to improved results. The average
attack detection rate, false positive rate and accuracy are shown in figure 6,7
and 8. However, the one parameter based approach did not produce acceptable
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Figure 5.4: Average Precision for kNN
results with either reduced data set based approach or full data set based approach.
Improved results are observed with the three parameter based approach but little
improvement is evident with the full data set. The attack detection rate for this
approach continues to decline further even with five parameter based approach.
The attack detection rate for the reduced data set based approach show high
improvement but may be not appropriate for industrial application because of
average attack detection rate of 74.4%. The ideal results are achieved with reduced
data set with five parameter based approach.
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CHAPTER 6
ANOMALY DETECTION IN
INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEM USING C4.5
DECISION TREE
6.1 Introduction
C4.5 is the most popular tree classifier that was introduced by Quinlan [50]. It
is a descendant algorithm of CLS [51]and ID3 [52]. It forms a decision tree to
describe the classifier and uses the decision tree to produce the rule set which is
a group of if-then statements. C4.5 generates an original decision tree based on
divide-and-conquer strategy described below.
Input: A training set S, a node T;
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Output: A decision tree with the root T;
1. If the instance is S belong to the same class or the amount of instance is
two few, set T as leaf node and label the node T with the most frequent
class in S ;
2. Otherwise,choose a test attribute X with two or more outcomes based on
selection criterion, and label the node T with X;
3. Partition S into subsets S1, S2, ......Sn according to the outcomes of attribute
X for each instance; generate T’ sn children nodes T1, T2, ......Tn;
4. For every group (Si, Si), build recursively a sub tree with the root Ti
6.2 Decision Trees
Information gain and default gain ratio are the two heuristics commonly used
by C4.5 to rank possible tests [4]. While information gain is able to minimize
the total entropy of the subsets, it shows heavy bias towards multi-valued at-
tributes. Alternatively, the default option is gain ratio that divides information
gain by the information provided by the test outcomes. Post the construction
of decision tree, C4.5 needs to deal with the problems of discretization of nu-
merical attributes, handling of missing value and pruning for the decision tree.
The format of the test outcomes depends on the attributes of a dataset that can
be either numeric or nominal. For a numerical attribute A, its output format is
A ≥ h,A < h, where the threshold h is found by sorting S on the values of A and
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choosing the split between successive values that maximizes the criterion above.
By default, an attribute A with discrete values has one outcome for each value,
but there are options that permit combining at least two subsets as an output.
To overcome the over-fitting problem of the training set, C4.5 performs pruning
of the primary decision tree using post-pruning methods. A pessimistic statisti-
cal reasoning method by estimating the error rate forms the basis of the pruning
algorithm. Assuming, N is the amount of instances in the instance set of the
associated tree node, E is the number of errors, q is the true error rate, and f is
the observed error rate. With a confidence threshold c (0.25 is the default value
for C4.5); confidence boundaries z can be obtained according to equation 6.1
Pr
[
f − q√
q (1− q)N > z
]
= c (6.1)
The pessimistic error estimation of a tree node is gained according to the
equation 6.2
e =
f + z
2
2N
+ z
√
f
N
− f2
N
+ z
2
4N2
1 + z
2
N
(6.2)
C4.5 prunes from the leaves to the root. For all leaves in a sub tree, it computes
their combination error estimation. If a leaf node replaces the sub tree, then C4.5
computes the error estimation of the leaf node. The leaf node substitutes the sub
tree if the current error estimation is lower than the combination error estimation
of the sub tree. The process repeats until no further replacements can take place.
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6.2.1 Rule Set Classifiers
Due to the distributed nature of information about a single class in a tree, it
may be difficult to interpret complex decision trees. As such, C4.5 uses groups
for if-then rules for each class to classify a case. The first rule that matches the
conditions outlined by a case classifies that case. In case no matching rule occurs,
C4.5 assigns a default class to the case. The initial (unpruned) decision tree
forms the C4.5 rule sets. Each path from the root of the tree to a leaf becomes a
prototype rule whose conditions are the outcomes along the path and whose class
is the label of the leaf. To simplify the rule the consequence of discarding each
condition is studied. Dropping a condition may result in rise in the number N of
cases covered by the rule, and the number E of cases that do not belong to the
class nominated by the rule, and may lower the pessimistic error rate determined
as above. The optimal pessimistic error rate is found by dropping conditions using
a hill-climbing algorithm. To finalize the process, C4.5 picks a subset of simplified
rules for each class and sorts them to minimize the error on the training cases. In
addition, it chooses a default class. As a result, the obtained rule set usually has
far fewer rules than the number of leaves on the pruned decision tree.
6.3 Result and Analysis
The C4.5 algorithm is executed in two phases: training phase and testing phase.
The 25% of the dataset is used in the training of C4.5 and testing criteria is done
on the 75% of the dataset.
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6.3.1 Implementation
We have used Weka [53], which is an open source tool with Java implementation of
data mining, machine learning algorithms, including data pre-processing, group-
ing, and association rule extraction. Weka is available under GNU general public
license. It provides a graphical user interface for interaction. It has special file
format Attribute-Relation File Format ”.ARFF”, in which data object are defined
fixed number of attributes.
High Sensitivity (1 Parameter)
The experimental results showed for the proposed approach with one parameter
based anomaly detection are summarized in table 6.1. The achieved average
accuracy with reduced feature set is 92.4%. The average accuracy suffers due
to low accuracy of 88.3% in group 2. The analysis of group 2 shows that the
accuracy is impacted due to low high false negatives. This implies that wrong
discriminating feature is selected in classification criteria. In case of full dataset
the average achieved accuracy is 72.6%. Performance degradation was observed
for group 1 as the detection accuracy dropped to 65%.
The average attack detection rate for the reduced feature based approach is
71.7%. The attack detection rate for group 2 is 53.3% which degrades the overall
attack detection rate. The full dataset based approach achieved the maximum
attack detection rate of 20.0% with the average detection rate of 15.0%. The
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Figure 6.1: Average False Positive Rate for C4.5 Decision Tree
extremely low attack detection rate is because of wrong selection of feature in
developing decision trees. The features that make a row anomalous can be any
one of eighteen columns and it changes in every row. This results in selection of
wrong discriminating feature.
The false positive rate is extremely low in all four groups in reduced feature
set based approach. This implies that the accuracy of this approach is affected by
number of false positives. The average false positive rate is 0.7%. In case of the
full dataset based approach the average false positive rate is 8.1%. the
Table 6.1: C4.5 1 Parameter Results
2* Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 18.5 0.0 2.2 11.9
Acc. 93.9 88.3 93.3 93.9 65.0 78.3 76.1 71.1
ADR 80.0 53.3 73.3 80.0 15.6 13.3 11.1 20.0
Precision 98.5 100 100 98.5 81.5 100 97.8 88.1
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Medium Sensitivity (3 Parameter)
The results are considerably improved by increasing the number of parameter
for anomaly detection to three. The attack detection rate of the full dataset
based approach is improved from 15% to 51.7% but still not suitable for practical
industrial control security solution. The improvement in the attack detection
rate is reflected in the accuracy. The accuracy for full dataset based approach is
improved to 85.0% from 72.6%. The false positive rate dropped to 3.9%
Similarly the results for reduced feature set based approach also improved. The
average attack detection rate is 91.7% as compare to 1 parameter based approach.
The accuracy is improved by 4.7% to 97.1%. The false positive rate is slightly
increased from 0.7% to 1.1%. The ideal false positive rate is achieved except
group 1. The false positive rate is increased from 1.5% to 4.4% but this increase
is negligible. The results for three parameter based approach across four groups
are shown in table 6.2.
Table 6.2: C4.5 3 Parameter Results
2* Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 5.9 0.7
Acc. 96.7 96.7 97.8 97.2 88.9 79.4 82.2 89.4
ADR 100.0 86.7 91.1 88.9 55.6 44.4 46.7 60.0
Precision 95.5 100 100 100 100 91.1 94.1 99.3
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Figure 6.2: Average Accuracy for C4.5 Decision Tree
Low Sensitivity (5 Parameter)
The ideal results with reduced dataset are achieved with five parameter based
approach, which is similar to SVM and kNN results. The analysis of the decision
tree shows that the decision is based on the most discriminating feature. This
results in the small tree size with binary decision logic.
Similar to other approach the best result for full dataset based approach is
achieved with five parameters. The average detection rate improved by 19.4%
to 71.1% with highest attack detection rate in group 4. The achieved average
accuracy is also improved to 87.8%. However the false positive rate is increased
to 6.7% when compare to three parameter based approach.
Summary C4.5 results follow the trend of SVM and kNN. The results im-
proved by increasing the number of parameters for anomaly detection. The aver-
age false positive rate, accuracy, attack detection rate and precision rate is shown
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in Fig 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 C4.5 achieved excellent precision rates with reduced
data set for all test cases. The average precision rate is between 98% to 100% in
all test cases The highest precision rate of 96% for full dataset based approach
is achieved with the three parameter based approach. The precision rate fall to
93% for five parameter based approach. However the attack detection rate is in-
creased in the five parameter based approach. The reduced features set based
approach outperform full dataset based approach in all test cases. The ideal re-
sults are achieved with five parameter based approach but the three parameter
based approach give the balance between performance and sensitivity to attacks.
The three parameter based approach produced high accuracy and near ideal false
positive rate. The attack detection rate is also acceptable for industrial control
system security.
Table 6.3: C4.5 5 Parameter Results
2* Reduced Feature Set Full Dataset
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4
FPR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 3.7 13.3
Acc, 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.1 89.4 89.4 86.1
ADR 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 73.3 57.8 68.9 84.4
Precision 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.4 100.0 96.3 86.7
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Figure 6.3: Average Attack Detection Rate for C4.5 Decision Tree
Figure 6.4: Average Precision for C4.5 Decision Tree
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The objective of this work was to develop an anomaly detection system for indus-
trial control networks. The static nature of industrial control processes help to
develop normal operation profiles that can be used to detect anomalous behavior
and system faults. The proposed anomaly detection system uses feature selection
to identify the relevant features to identify malicious behavior. It also helps in
reducing the feature set for anomaly detection. The system uses Support Vector
Machine, k-Nearest Neighbor and C4.5 algorithm. The proposed system shows
that good attack detection rate and system accuracy. SVM and C4.5 produced
accurate results even for high and medium sensitivity attacks. As compare to this
kNN was unable to produce good result for low and medium sensitivity attacks
test cases. The future work involves the testing of the proposed ADS in different
industrial control system such as Oil and Gas industry. The future direction also
involves in testing of different classification algorithm by incorporating physical
system knowledge.
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